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Hollowness of the states
In the Middle East, the situation is the worst and continues to worsen even more. For instance, Damascus now controls about one-third of Syrian territory in the West. ISIS had established its Islamic State centered on Raqqa and extending to a larger part of Iraq; Syrian Kurds have established semi-autonomous ‘cantons’ along the Turkish border. They argue they aren’t claiming an independent state but rather a bottom-up, popular government of the cantons. Another part of the country, the area around Aleppo, is being disputed among the Al-Qaeda-aligned Jabhat al-Nusra, so-called moderate groups supported to some degree by the United States and GCC countries, ISIS, and government forces along with the militias aligned with them. The situation in Iraq and Lebanon is no different; the underground militias in this region have much more power than the state’s official militaries. It’s also clear that these states try to survive these circumstances with the help of specific patterns of governance. In Iraq and Syria, the major mechanism for state survival has been the authoritarianism of regimes. Lebanon survives by violating the state dwindling even more, with power residing in the hands of confessional communities and their foreign backers.
To understand the reasons behind the tensions, we should know that, with the exception of Egypt, most Arab states are recent creations less than a century old. The mass media is keen to blame the more recent conflicts on a Sunni-Shia divide, but there is a more complicated story of arbitrary borders dividing nationalities, of local rulers deliberately chosen from religious minorities and imposed by colonial powers, to divide and rule, being promoted as the economic and financial partners of imperialist countries. And the right for them to act like this has been given since the imposition of the mandate system upon them by the League of Nations, or the international community, according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. These powers—France and Britain—had no experience with state-building overseas; colonization was about control, pacification, and low-cost administration, not about state-building.
To address the failure of state-building, we need to get acquainted with the attitudes of France and Britain towards their colonies. To start with, France considered its role as one of protecting Christians in the region as well as propagating French culture. In Lebanon, this meant supporting Christians through the promotion of pro-Maronite policies, while in Syria, it aimed to weaken the power of Muslim clergy or Ulema by supervising Waqf land. The expansion of Franco-Muslim secondary schools was part of the aim to propagate French culture. Britain didn’t take on any cultural role, contrary to some historical claims regarding British support for Zionist immigration. An extension of Western civilization seems unlikely to have influenced British attitudes towards Jewish settlements in Palestine. For example, the British government owned a 51% share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and wanted a better deal in its mandated territory, Iraq, for the oil fields of Mosul. In addition, Britain needed control of trade routes between the Indian subcontinent and Europe, which emphasized the importance of the Suez Canal. The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz necessitated the maintenance of air bases in Basra and Baghdad. Throughout the 1930s, the Anglo-Iraq Treaty and later the maintenance of garrisons in Egypt directed British policy in the region.
For a vivid and detailed picture of the problems, it’s better to have an overview of the governments of these states in the past. Firstly, to Mesopotamia, Britain installed Faisal, one of Sharif Husain’s sons, as King, hoping he would prove loyal and compliant in return, but this was not the case. The British were also facing nationalists who wanted independence, not subordination to a mandate, in the cities, with a rebellion in the old Mosul province of the Ottoman Empire, where Kurds have been agitating for a state of their own since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The British had enough power to repress the opposition and retain control, but they didn’t have the time or capacity to build a functioning political system, institutions, and a common identity. These factors, along with several others, led to the end of the British mandate in 1932, and the hollowness of the new state became evident. By 1941, the country had experienced five military coups d’état. The installation—change in opinion—of a pro-Nazi government under Nuri al-Said, Prime Minister since 1930, and the change in public opinion that made them break off the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, tried to hinder the movement of British troops out of their bases in Iraq and allowed Nazi aircraft to refuel. This led to the short Anglo-Iraq war, which began in the spring from Habbaniyyah Air Base, setting the stage for a new period of British occupation that lasted until 1947.
Then, in 1948, the new Premier Jabr’s government signed a British-Galaxy agreement, a huge success for the Western camp, as this was the time of the Cold War, in efforts to build an anti-Soviet alliance. In 1958, Abd al-Karim Qasim seized power, abolished the monarchy, took Iraq out of the Baghdad Pact, discussed the possibility of joining the United Arab Republic with Egypt and Syria, and threatened to nationalize oil, much to the concern of Washington and London. Inevitably, when Qasim was ousted in 1963, the CIA was accused of complicity. Certainly, Washington was relieved by the situation. Things didn’t improve for Iraq, which remained in turmoil under a series of military governments of short duration until the rise to power of Saddam Hussein. But he was removed by American intervention in 2003, by which the full extent of the hollowness became apparent again. Saddam’s role as Premier had relieved the situation to some extent by strengthening the authoritarian regime. After him came Nouri al-Maliki, whose government can be blamed for sectarianism and incompetence and was certainly largely responsible for creating the political stalemate that paved the way for the current crisis in Iraq. The Iraqi army became dominated by incompetent, unpopular officers whose only quality was loyalty to the Shia government. This ignited tribal leaders and Sunni politicians in Northern Iraq. With their cooperation and coordination, ISIS was able to capture so many cities. They believed the Sunni leaders would prepare the ground for an Islamic State, not realizing that being part of the ISIS-led rogue state, with little or no access to oil, would mean living in a state where self-appointed caliphs would interfere forcefully in every aspect of the private and social lives of Iraqi citizens in the cities under its control, irrespective of their religious and cultural backgrounds.
Kurdistan is also a notable point in Iraq—in Syria too. They are hoping to benefit from the situation by calling for Kurdish independence, having secured (temporary) control of the Kirkuk oil refinery. On July 1, 2014, Massoud Barzani, the president of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region, announced that he intended to hold a referendum within months. Iraq was already ‘effectively partitioned,’ he added. No sooner had Barzani spoken than the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, promised cooperation with any new Kurdish state. There is’a historical background of Israeli-Kurdish relations. A photograph from the 1960s showing Massoud Barzani’s father, Mustafa, embracing the then-defense minister of Israel, Moshe Dayan, is evidence of this.However, all these reactionary states understand that the creation of a new state under the current circumstances is impossible. ISIS could no longer move a step forward if they were aware of the collapse of Al-Qaeda forces led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who controlled a large portion of northern Iraq. The Kurdish leadership itself knows that their ultimate goal of independence cannot be realized under current conditions, especially given the economic considerations. Firstly, Barzani clearly hopes to benefit from oil revenues generated from areas under his control, but the Kurdish authorities are currently in dispute with the central government, and Baghdad is withholding payment of the share of the national budget allocated to the Kurdish regional government. Secondly, and most importantly, the territory is landlocked, and the ‘independence’ plan is based on income gained from the export of oil resources through Turkey.
In other words, the economic survival of a new Iraqi Kurdistan would be in the hands of Ankara instead of Baghdad. Turkish support for a Kurdish state would no doubt include plans to control and silence aspirations for independence in Turkish Kurdistan. Everyone knows this, but by the creation of new states, someone always benefits— from politicians who secure positions of power to businessmen who prosper beyond productive barriers, to civil servants who hold steady salaries—and that cannot be stopped until the region attains complete stability, free from the ‘humanitarian’ intervention of the West and their interference in selecting leaders.Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine have similar stories to that of Iraq. In Syria’s case, it was ruled by the French, who, during the colonial period, divided it into six separate mini-states: Damascus, Aleppo, the State of Alawites, Jebel Druze, the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and Greater Lebanon. After the mandate ended, Syria remained extremely unstable, experiencing 20 cabinets and four different constitutions between 1946 and 1956. The cycle of military coups continued until 1970, when Hafez al-Assad rose to power in a coup and stabilized the country until his death in 2000. Bashar al-Assad, his son, succeeded him and managed to stabilize the country until the uprisings that shook the Arab world in 2011, leading the country into war and bringing it towards a state of collapse. Palestine was the one that was wholly subjected to vulnerable problems. It was Britain’s mandate, and their policy regarding setting up a state for the Jewish people, or the so-called Balfour Declaration, satisfied neither side. The British toyed with the idea of forming a small Jewish state in Palestine but also planned on covering a vast area, which enraged the Arabs as well. This very state is at the heart of many problems, even in these days of relative serenity.
Conclusion
Iran’s former supreme leader, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, during a visit to Saudi Arabia, stated:
“To fight extremism… A collective effort should be made by all Muslim countries, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, in order to prevent a perception that Islamic nations and governments depend on foreign powers to maintain their stability and security.”
I strongly believe in his idea as a solution. Even though he mentions ‘extremism,’ the message he shares, particularly with Saudi Arabia, is significant. The Middle East’s problems are none other than those created by the West. And currently, calling for the West to solve them creates a problem of contradictions. The persuasive 'humanitarian’ interventions are the greatest evidence to date of this? They are largely hypocritical. Because all ‘humanitarian’ interventions are political, with the single aim of advancing the geopolitical hegemony of US imperialism⁸. Otherwise, we would have witnessed, if not a military action by the US, at least a forthright condemnation as Israel continues to kill thousands of innocent children in Gaza and Rafah.
There is also a past example in 2007 and after, where the US first halted Assad’s atrocities by the same intervention, rendering many casualties and causing economic destruction, and then intervened again to support the bombing of pro-Assad forces, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard—which was its greatest enemy from Iran’s nuclear program of 2007—as ground troops to recapture Iraqi Shia towns.Coming up with direct solutions through diplomacy mediated by outsiders has seen no success. Those who argue otherwise always cite the Dayton Agreement that put an end to war and slaughter in Bosnia But it can be easily countered by arguing that Bosnia is outside the Levant. Apart from that, the Biden-Gülen plan of 2006, the Geneva Communiqué of 2012, and the Vienna Communiqué of 2015 were all complete failures. All things considered, there is no point in prescribing solutions because, on one hand, we cannot accept the socio-imperialist call in favor of ‘humanitarian’ intervention, and on the other hand, we cannot offer support for the reactionary states.
References
- Barr, James Barr, A-line the sand; Britain:France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East(London:Simon&Schuster,2011)
- Tinsley, M Tinsley, Whose colonialism?the contested memory of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, London, Pomeps Blog, 2015
- President Wilson's addendum to the Fourteen Points, II February 1918
- Bilgin, Pinar Bilgin, What's the point about Sykes-Picot?, New York, Global Affairs, Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, 2016
- Gause, F. Gregory Gause, Is this the end of Sykes-Picot? The Washington Post, Washington, 2015
- Danforth, N Danforth, Stop blaming colonial borders for the Middle East's problems, The Atlantic, London, 2017.
- Gause, F.Gregory Gause III, The New Middle East Cold War, Brookings Doha Center, ed.2 Doha,2014,p.14
- Hughes, Aron W Hughes, The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the making of the modern Middle East, The Conversation, London 2016
- Gasper, Michael Gasper, Making of the Modern Middle East, Sage Publication, New York, 2020
- Howorth, Jolyon Howorth, How the century-old deal between France and Britain got jihadis excited, The Conversation, London,2014
- Rogan, Eugene Rogan, A century aŌer Sykes-Picot, The Cairo Review, Cairo, ed. 3, 2015
- Ottaway, Marina OƩaway, Wilson Center, Washington,2015
- Mather, Yassemine Mather, The rise and fall of the OƩoman Empire and the current conflict in the Middle East